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This extensive and well-documented case study of Medicaid' is a
welcome addition to the literature on the history and current status
of programs to provide and finance health services in this country.
The services provided under this particular health services pro-
gram have been substantial. Medicaid served twenty-three million
low-income people in 1973, or ten percent of the population. Pub-
lic funds totaling nine billion dollars were expended, representing
about eight to ten percent of health service expenditures from all
sources. Over one-half of this amount-five billion dollars--was
provided by the federal government. The rest came from the
states and localities, although much of this sum would not have
been forthcoming without the stimulus of federal grant-matching.
The program was an administrative and fiscal fiasco. Services
were unevenly distributed among the states, and sudden increases
in the costs of medical care quickly outdistanced the states' ability
to finance them, even granting their willingness. Within the three
years from 1965 to 1968, Medicaid plunged from tremendous (and
unrealistic) promise to a severe retrenchment that the authors
aptly call the "Euphoric Demise." Such a decline might have been
anticipated after the general excessive optimism of President
Johnson's Great Society. Yet the authors feel that Medicaid has
been "phenomenally successful" when measured by its sheer
magnitude;2 it reveals again that the American social and political
system is capable of delivering "sheer magnitude" for a short time,
and then retrenching in similar magnitude.
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I
The authors are well qualified and well situated to write a case
study of Medicaid. Both have written extensively on public policy:
Robert Stevens on legal problems, and Rosemary Stevens on medi-
cal care institutions, particularly the growth of medical specializa-
tion in Great Britain and the United States. Robert Stevens is Pro-
fessor of Law at Yale; Rosemary Stevens is Associate Professor of
Public Health (Medical Care) at Yale. Both are originally from
Great Britain and received their basic education there at well-
known institutions, and further training at Yale; both have been
consultants to various divisions of HEW.
As a chronology of Medicaid, the book is an exhaustive and
excellent source of information about what happened where, at
what time, at what cost, to whose benefit or loss, and so on. The
vignettes about pivotal states like California and New York, which
had different administrative structures but similar experiences (es-
calating costs), are additions to the literature as case studies. And
this is what the authors apparently intended to write.
But one should not turn to this book for an explanation of how
situations and events shaped Medicaid's policies, nor for a delinea-
tion of the constraints that are inherent in all attempts to achieve
certain health delivery objectives. In setting forth their objectives
and method of study, the authors write:
Medicaid might well be analyzed as an illustration of general
principles or theories of political development. Equally, quan-
titative studies of selected aspects of the program, and espe-
cially its costs and utilization, are sorely needed. These ap-
proaches remain for others; indeed, one of our hopes for this
book is that it will stimulate further research on Medicaid from
both the theoretical and quantitative points of view. We chose
the historical method for ourselves in the hope of providing
a comprehensive understanding of how and why Medicaid
developed, its major characteristics, its strengths, its tensions,
and its weaknesses. 3
This statement seems to imply that a "historical method" does not
demand a conceptual framework-a theory of how the social ma-
trix and political system influence the development of a given
health service delivery system. If the authors had furnished one,
they could have given us at least a partial explanation of why
Medicaid evolved as it did. And they might have fulfilled their own
3. P. xx (fbotnote omitted).
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purposes more adequately, for they write: "Our aim has been to
make it possible for our readers-whether they be scholars, civil
servants, lawyers, social workers, welfare recipients, or politicians
-to develop informed responses to the program's dilemmas
and to be able to view other medical-care programs in perspec-
tive."4
Their only allusion to a formal model, Braybrooke and
Lindblom's A Strategy of Decision (1963), exemplifies the casualness
of their occasional hints that some kind of framework might be
possible. The reference is in a footnote, which reads: "In many
senses, for instance, our study reinforces the Lindblom thesis con-
cerning the development of solutions to social policy problems.
Historic comprehensive solutions are rarely available; means and
ends are invariably interwoven; and solutions emerge rather than
being created. In this sense Title XIX [Medicaid] is an example of
'disjointed incrementalism.' '" s The authors do not, as might
reasonably be expected, go on to discuss whether "disjointed in-
crementalism" is the only method we have in policy formulation
and program implementation. A rigorous analysis is entirely lack-
ing. In fact, it is doubtful that the authors consistently adhere to
their asserted acceptance of the Braybrooke and Lindblom theory.
Taken as a whole, the book seems to embrace a contrary position:
that it is possible to plan entire "systems" of health services, and
further, assuming that directed planning is feasible, that it can be
done in a political system that is not given to directed planning, but
rather to building consensus in the hope that plans will emerge of
themselves.
Thus, despite their unwillingness to theorize, the Stevenses still
implicitly rely on a model of a social, political, and health services
system. They invite us to envision a body politic and a government
that practice perfect distributive justice, devoting little attention to
costs and much more to benefits. In their model, health service is
comprehensive, rationally planned, and regionalized; physicians
are salaried; there is emphasis on prevention; the distribution of
services is reasonably even; and the financing is equitable, that is,
accomplished mainly through a progressive income tax. The
Stevenses clearly sympathize with a view they ascribe to some re-
formers: that "national health insurance could put an end to eligi-
bility difficulties, inequities, low-quality service, state greed, and
4. Pp. xx-xxi.
5. P. xxi n.3.
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subsidies for the providers of medical services."' 6 This is quite a
promise and no such model can be found anywhere; the best exist-
ing programs only approximate it. Although the authors some-
times evince more circumspection than the foregoing passage
might indicate, they seem bothered by economic and political
realities, regarding them as annoyances rather than situations
within which one is forced to work.
The authors take their model so utterly for granted as a norm
that they do not strive to reveal it in its entirety to their readers.
They assume, for example, that it is anomalous for a publicly fi-
nanced program to carry out its mandate by contracting with a
private intermediary. "Medicare . . . began with an apparent
paradox. Private enterprise had failed, markedly, to provide ade-
quate health insurance for the elderly: hence, the passage of Medi-
care. Yet private insurance was chosen to administer the new gov-
ernmental system."'7 This is no paradox; a failure of private health
insurance in one context has no necessary relationship to the ques-
tion of whether to use private carriers in another context. The
government was faced with a need for quick implementation, and
private insurance was the obvious answer.
Another example is their report that Illinois's planned cutback in
Medicaid support was expected to throw Chicago's ghetto area doc-
tors into a position of relying completely on the effective demand
of ghetto residents. Some expressed fears that doctors would leave
the area. The authors merely remark: "The neighboring Chicago
School of Business economists would not have dissented."'8 This is a
rather cavalier way of dismissing the market-nonmarket debate re-
garding the distribution of health services; neither approach
should be denigrated, since in most countries the sectors are
mixed.
The authors feel that the spiraling costs of Medicaid are "at root
problems of goals, authority, and administration"9 because
Medicaid was tacked on to the existing health services delivery
system, which has always been open-ended in its rate controls
-when it has had any-and in its volume controls. They assume,
therefore, that goals, authority, and accountability, particularly
goals, are operationally possible in the structuring and administra-
tion of a health services delivery system. I would take serious issue.
6. P. 353.
7. Pp. 50-51.
8. P. 297.
9. P. 132.
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All three of these ideals are inherently fuzzy in an enterprise, such
as a health services delivery system, lacking both input and output
measures of any meaningful sort. The authors bear out this obser-
vation in at least three quotations, although the implications are
not developed. First: "In the hallowed tradition of welfare, costs
were becoming more important than services."'10 I agree that this
phenomenon is not peculiar to Medicaid. Second: "As a working
philosophy, decisions were made to extend services to the poor up
to a level that would not antagonize the general population and to
increase fees to the extent necessary not to antagonize the health
professionals."" I would say that political compromise is inherent in
any health services system. Third: "Not surprisingly, there were to
be almost immediate tensions between the practical realities of wel-
fare administration and the expansionist rhetoric of mainstream
medicine."' 2 I would say that the tension is normal: any "main-
stream" medicine worth having should be expansionist in its ten-
dencies.
What we should have, the authors suggest, is a health service
delivery model like the one implicit in the Committee of 100's
proposed Health Security Act, then known as the Kennedy-
Griffiths bill.' 3 The authors are not sanguine that this solution is
politically possible. They believe that politicians are unconscionably
cost-conscious (as presumably are the taxpayers). Yet they main-
tain their faith that somehow we can reach comprehensive and
"rational" health service, although in all likelihood-given the his-
tory of publicly financed services-it would be so inadequately fi-
nanced that many Americans would opt out in order to gain more
liberal benefits and amenities than a public system would be willing
to fund.
II
The Medicaid experience, as revealed in this book, teaches sev-
eral lessons about the nature of health services delivery systems.
These lessons also have implications for national health insurance
planning.
First, we must design programs so that they are workable. No
delivery system should rely on the concept-enshrined in Medicare
and Medicaid-of reimbursing physicians on the basis of "prevail-
10. P. 95.
11. P. 102.
12. P. 73.
13. S. 3 & H.R. 22, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
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ing and reasonable" fees. There should be negotiated fee
schedules, in order to give the administrators at least a degree of
cost predictability over time. Likewise, no delivery system should
rely on cost-plus reimbursement to hospitals (although, indeed,
Medicaid rates to hospitals commonly fell below cost). Prospective
reimbursement has greater promise. Another point is that the con-
cept of medical indigence is administratively unworkable; it has no
meaningful operational definition. Setting expenditure magnitudes
by income level is the only objective criterion.
Second, our choice of funding mechanism should derive from a
conscious balancing between desired expenditure levels and other
considerations. If a health services system is funded from general
revenues, it will receive less financial support than if a variety of
funding sources are used, including payroll deduction. 14 Further-
more, exclusively public funding of health and welfare services will
inevitably lead to a system with tight funding and chronic under-
staffing. A plurality of funding sources will keep the system loose.
To some people, on the other hand, cost containment is the
primary purpose of a health services system. From this perspec-
tive, centralized funding and planning would be preferable, even
assuming a lack of meaningful output measures. With such cen-
tralization, politicians would also be sensitized to the length of vari-
ous queues and would have some basis for knowing what meas-
ures were needed to achieve more or less equal access to services.
There would be a clear structure and over time the actors within it
could reach a politically tolerable equilibrium.
Third, this country will not-and should not-leap into a na-
tional health insurance system that is comprehensive in the services
it provides. Medicaid demonstrates the fiasco of trying to achieve
sudden comprehensiveness through massive public funding. I
think the authors are realistic enough that they would agree, albeit
reluctantly.
Fourth, in the interests of distributive justice, it might be better
to improve on Medicaid for a large number of lower income
families, earning, say, up to $10,000 a year. If, instead, their health
care is encompassed in a national health insurance scheme in which
they have to scramble for services in competition with the other
forty percent of the population, their problems are likely to be
buried, as I believe is the result in such schemes in other countries.
14. The authors might reject the latter approach, however, both in the interests of
progressivity and in order to allow government officials flexibility with which to reorganize
and manipulate the system.
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The authors might agree with this observation also-grudgingly,
however, because a nonuniversal plan would violate their concept
of equity.
III
In the final chapter the authors express an interesting belief
about the potential disadvantages of using a piecemeal or incre-
mental approach to building an eventually comprehensive and ra-
tional health services delivery system. 15 They believe that incre-
mental development will result in more surveillance and regulation
than would be found in a quickly enacted, highly structured health
service, presumably resembling the British model. The actors in the
British system know its boundaries; consequently, there are not
specific controls on the volume or services and costs. Costs have
gone up, but not as drastically as those in the United States or in
the national health insurance systems of other countries. 16 It would
be fallacious, however, to make easy extrapolations from the
British scheme. British doctors tend to believe that the efforts of
their welfare state are legitimate. They bargain hard within the
structure of the system; income and working conditions are con-
stantly negotiated. So far, however, they have not complained of
interference with their professional prerogatives to diagnose and
treat.
As a matter of fact, policy makers, planners, and administrators
in all countries with which I am familiar seem to assume that there
is a single rational model for an ideal health services delivery sys-
tem. Supposedly this model can transcend the historical and con-
temporary matrix of any given country, providing a universally
optimal "fit" between population needs, financial and personnel
resources, and professional judgments about diagnosis and
therapy. The model apparently is thought to resemble a blueprint
by which one can rebuild an Italian Fiat factory in Leningrad (as
was done), with Russian workmen being trained to repeat all the
mechanical motions, so that in due course a Fiat rolls off the as-
sembly line, although with a different name.
To me it seems unlikely that any health service model could
transcend its own milieu. We witness a wide range of health deliv-
15. P. 360.
16. Even so, Great Britain is exceedingly cost conscious within its tight structure. Every
country I know of, except the USSR, believes it is spending too much money on health
services.
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ery systems that ostensibly work and are related to local economic,
social, and political conditions. Nevertheless, all health service sys-
tems are taking on more structure and boundaries, with greater
centralization of control. Presumably this is being done to even out
inequities and, more important, to enable the government to pre-
dict and control costs. In the future, personnel will more often
be salaried, and the allocation of facilities and personnel will be
planned more comprehensively. Hence there will be less free-
dom for individual units in relation to the whole, and fewer chances
for optional action outside the system. Medicaid (like Medicare) can
be regarded as an object lesson in this long-term process, by virtue
of its staggering eruption of costs. As the authors indicate, it may
well accelerate legislation for national health insurance, American
style, with the controls built in. The logic in the broader evolu-
tion is relentless, because no system knows how to fashion a
"proper" health service. I think that the Stevenses have reluctantly
come to the same conclusion. But their "historical method" does
not help the reader to get there.
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